Inconsistencies and barriers in regulatory frameworks

The respective regulatory arrangements in the three countries help explain the degree of willingness with which the private sector engaged with the partners from each of the three countries. Although the Bt cotton project in East Africa began with the BBI grant in 2006, the project activities in each country began at different times due to differences in the biosafety regulations and the management of biosafety matters among the three East African countries. Studies in Kenya began in earnest in 2007 while those in Uganda began in 2008, both having been delayed by the biosafety approval processes—which, in some instances, were perceived by the project management as a deliberate move by the regulators to slow down the process because of suspicion of incompetence on the part of the former. To forestall these suspicions the project management made efforts to address any foreseeable regulatory concerns before applying for regulatory approvals. In Tanzania, the delay was due to what the private partner considered to be unfavorable legislation in the country, which prevented Monsanto from providing the Bt cotton technology for trials in the country.

We observed that the regulatory differences and their impact on project activities did not threaten trust among the public institutions implementing the project. The interviewees from the public institutions did not point to any factor that could compromise trust among them, but they reported of a mutual working relationship among them. However, in order for the private sector to be fully engaged as a partner and active in the project activities, there was a need not only for a consistent regulatory regime in the three countries but one that is acceptable to all stakeholders. The interviewee from Monsanto emphasized that trust develops when parties deliver on commitments that are based on an acceptable biosafety legal framework. The good relationship between KARI and Monsanto, for example, shed light on two factors that contributed to trust building between the two. First, there is a favorable biosafety legal framework in Kenya [8], which enabled Monsanto to enter into an agreement with KARI. Second, the technical staff were not only competent but also committed to, and passionate about, delivering on the agreed upon milestones. Subsequently, as the objectives of the agreement were achieved, trust between the partners grew. Similarly, the interviewee from Monsanto acknowledged that, in Uganda, the National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy 2008 [19] provided a suitable environment for private sector engagement which served as a foundation on which trust building practices would be anchored.

Contrastingly, lack of a favorable regulatory environment in Tanzania resulted in a case in which the field trials of Bt cotton scheduled to be conducted in Tanzania were transferred to Kenya due to the latter’s more favorable regulatory regime. There was, as a result, no direct contact between TPRI and Monsanto in this project, according to an interviewee from the TPRI, and therefore no possibility of trust building between the two institutions.

We observe that the aforementioned inconsistencies in, and barriers to, the regulatory process posed significant hurdles to trust building among partners and with the community. According to the interviewees, there is a need for a legal framework conducive to private sector participation, which will serve as a foundation for trust building. Individual country regulatory frameworks are therefore necessary for the progress and success of GM crop development projects. For example, even if the harmonized research protocols render the results of the Tanzanian trials in Kenya acceptable to regulators in Tanzania, access to the private sector technologies for broader adoption of the GM technologies will require a regulatory regime that is more acceptable than it currently is and encourages the partners’ confidence in the process.

Baseline trust and legislation as foundations for trust building

There were divergent views from the public and private sector regarding the basis on which trust among the partners in the project grew. We deduce that this may be due to differences in the working cultures of the two sectors. The interviewees from the public institutions suggested that their initial engagement was based on the presence of what they described as ‘baseline trust,’ on which further trust building could take place, while the private sector emphasized that trust grew based on a negotiated agreement among partners working within an acceptable legislative framework.

Immediately upon the project’s inception, the public institutions decided to collaborate on an understanding that they will be able to work together to build trust. According to a scientist from PBS (the funding institution that also initiated the development of the joint proposal), this early engagement was based on some baseline trust on which the parties further built trust. ‘Baseline trust’ was understood by the scientist from PBS to be a particular level of trust between parties which is partly based on knowledge of past collaborations in similar projects and determined by the willingness of the parties to participate in the joint application of the grant (i.e., the initial engagement). Later on, the public institutions put in place structural management practices, including harmonization of research protocols and organizational management processes, which contributed to enhancing trust among themselves and progress in the project.

However, an interviewee from Monsanto underscored the need for a legal framework that would facilitate their active participation, emphasizing the fact that, in agbiotech PPPs, the existing legislation in a country defines the nature of the relationship among partners. The interviewee from Monsanto stated that the relationship among the partners is influenced less by trust than by legality; specifically, it is within a relationship bound by clear legislation that parties engage, negotiate and sign agreements stipulating partner roles and obligations. The presence or lack of trust, then, is determined by what ensues from such agreements (i.e., whether or not the partners deliver on agreements). For example, in the aforementioned relationship between KARI and Monsanto, trust between the two institutions was built partly as a result of the parties delivering on agreements founded on an acceptable biosafety law.

Joint and transparent planning sessions

Despite the lack of formal documentation outlining the responsibilities of each partner institution at the inception of the project—as reported by the interviewees from the public institutions—their initial joint participation in developing the project proposal had established a strong foundation for ensuring accountability. Though the project was initially brought together by a need to unify the proposals of the three different countries for funding purposes, subsequent progress in the project reflected the value of transparent and joint planning sessions among the partners. During such meetings, financial matters were said to have been discussed openly among project partners in order to reinforce an environment of mutual accountability. The implementing partners also engaged in regular communication and information sharing, which enhanced trust. This pattern was seen through the project lifespan and was evidenced by commitment, mutual support and resource sharing – all of which contributed to building trust among the implementing partners. However, in retrospect, a TPRI partner interviewee felt that the planning could have been enhanced for better performance and trust among the partners in the project. Because of this apparent dissatisfaction with the planning, resources reserved for research were later used for non-core project activities such as holding meetings to make changes to project activities to accommodate unforeseen changes. As a result, interviewees acknowledged that there were delays in starting certain project activities, therefore necessitating a request to extend the project life.

Sharing information and resources

The sharing of resources and information is one outstanding feature of the Bt cotton project in East Africa that contributed to trust building. Information generated by any of the core partner institutions was shared among all the partners in the project through phone calls and exchange visits – all of which helped build trust. By relaying experiences including challenges and sharing data, interviewees described a mutual, collaborative relationship that enhanced trust and progress in the project. A free flow of information prevented overlaps in research and permitted scientists sufficient independence and a sense of confidence in each other.

On the topic of resource sharing, a scientist we interviewed from KARI alluded to the TPRI–KARI relationship, whereby KARI hosted Tanzania’s trials in Kenya. Specifically, KARI provided land, transportation and other forms of facilitation at a subsidized rate, which helped cement trust between the two institutions. An academic from Makerere University described the practice of sharing information and resources as an accountable and collaborative approach which contributed to enhancing trust. Sharing of resources and information helped the parties synergize their strengths to improve project results. Spielman et al. [20] pointed out that synergies in agbiotech research may ideally lead to outcomes of greater quantity and with greater chances of success. We posit that the sharing of information and resources across the three countries served to build trust among the project partners and the data generated for regulatory approval may also contribute to a more unified regulatory regime in the region.

Lack of public awareness and negative perception of GM crops

One factor that appeared to have contributed to slow regulatory approvals was limited awareness of GM technology among the public and specifically among government technical staff. Interviewees hypothesized that the suspicion surrounding the technology may stem from a lack of understanding of GM crops.

According to some interviewees, there is ignorance among frontline agricultural extension workers in East Africa, which is likely to influence the farmers’ perceptions about, and trust in, GM crops. A recent study has shown that awareness of GM crops among members of the public and technical staff in Tanzania is poor [21]. An example of this stems from our interview with a biosafety regulator in Tanzania who stated that the public in Tanzania is not in favor of GM crops. Such skepticism, which leads to distrust in the technology, has been partly attributed to ideas propagated by misinformed media and anti-GM groups, which foster distrust between the project partners and the public. A stakeholder from KARI and another from AIRF identified the presence of anti-GM groups as contributing to the misrepresentation of GM crops. Negative and inaccurate perceptions fuelled by such groups were said to often reach farmers before they receive accurate information from the project partners, leading to misconceptions about GM crops.

We observed that lack of awareness about GM crops—even among public research institutions, regulatory institutions and ministries of agriculture—coupled with the delivery of inaccurate information to the public is likely to negatively influence public perception, and, in turn, impact regulatory decision-making processes.

Negative views about private sector involvement

The involvement of private multinational seed companies in the partnership also contributed to the community’s distrust in the Bt cotton project. It has been reported that in sub-Saharan Africa the public holds unfavorable views about the involvement of the private sector in agbiotech projects [22]. Farmers, stakeholders from the seed sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focused on agriculture all view the involvement of private companies, particularly multinational ones, as being driven by a desire to monopolize the seed industry and therefore see the private sector as a potential threat to the food sovereignty of African countries [22]. The interviewees therefore perceived that public distrust about private sector involvement in the partnership stemmed from fear of corporate control of the seed technology and the view that the private sector seeks to make profits at the cost of the community. Part of this distrust was also said to be related to fear among members of the public that the Bt cotton would have the “terminator gene”, which prevents the seed from germinating if re-planted (which is a common practice among farmers). A scientist from KARI emphasized the need to continuously assure the farmers that there is no terminator gene. Negative perceptions about the private sector (including Monsanto)—the source of the Bt cotton technology—only serves to strengthen skepticism about the technology, which may affect regulatory approval processes for the technology.

Community engagement and awareness-building initiatives

In view of the poor public awareness and negative perceptions about the private sector, there was an expressed urgency for enhanced public awareness of GM technology, as public perceptions can have negative repercussions not only on the regulatory process but also on the commercialization and adoption of the Bt cotton. Pre-conceived ideas about GM crops among members of the community, irrespective of their level of education, were said to likely render the process difficult. It has been reported that substantial public information about GM technology is useful both for regulatory processes and assuring the public of ownership of the project [23].

To gain the public’s trust, the core partners engaged stakeholders at every level. KARI, for example, made use of their Bt cotton field trials to create awareness through a program called “Seeing-is-Believing,” where journalists, politicians, farmers and government officials were taken for visits to the trial sites to allow them to make their own comparison of Bt cotton and conventional cotton. A scientist from KARI recognized the need for farmer engagement in GM technology development in order to boost adoption of this controversial technology. The visits help demystify the technology—and the processes of developing it—to members of the public.

An interviewee from AIRF in Tanzania noted that education and training of farmers were effective for enhancing public trust in Bt cotton, especially since seminars were held in local languages. At the same time, engaging the media was seen as a strategy to preventing alarmist reporting, and as such could facilitate trust building. These impacts were expected to translate, gradually, into the development of a regulatory framework that would enable broader exploitation of the GM crops in the region. In Uganda, a similar initiative was spearheaded by representatives from the Makerere University. An interviewee from the university reported the positive remarks made by farmers who had participated in the Seeing-is-Believing tours. An interviewee from the national regulatory authority in Uganda stated, “trust is known by what you do.” These initiatives reflected well on the partners and helped build the public’s trust in them.

Awareness creation through public education and the innovative "Seeing-is-Believing" tours provided an opportunity for multiple stakeholders to engage directly with researchers, compare the Bt cotton against the conventional varieties, and form their own opinions about the Bt cotton technology. Interviewees noted that the awareness creation measures led to a significant decline in negative perceptions of the Bt cotton technology and was helpful in building trust.