In sub-Saharan Africa, cultural norms strongly determine men’s and women’s roles related to livestock [1]. It has been well documented that livestock productivity improvements can improve the well-being of resource-poor smallholder farmers, but the benefits to household members and degree and type of investments (time/labour, financial) each contributes may differ between household members [1, 2]. Moreover, there is evidence that productivity improvements result in loss of entitlement by women and that ownership of livestock assets plays a significant role in determining entitlements to the benefits that are associated with those assets [2, 3]. “Gender considerations relating to access to and control over assets play a major role in determining how income does or does not translate into welfare” [4]. Women may not have an incentive to invest in productivity improvements if they are not compensated for any additional labour requirements above and beyond current demands [1, 5]. Moreover, a growing body of literature describes the inadequacy of models wherein households are viewed either as one entity with a single set of preferences (unitary models), or as multiple individuals operating in their own best interest (non-cooperative models) [4, 6, 7]. Rather there is a need for consideration of the complexity of relationships within households, i.e. individuals make decisions based on the interests of others and their own self-interest, and some interests are common while others conflict [6, 8].

Household members may have differing preferences and abilities to impact intra-household decision-making outcomes [4, 7, 8]. Agency, “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them” for example through decision-making, and gaining, retaining, and exercising command over goods and income [9] may differ between members of the same household. Some individuals may overtly exercise agency, while others may act covertly (e.g. through deception, manipulation, subversion, resistance, bargaining, and negotiation) in order to mitigate the relative disadvantage they experience [9].

Agricultural development projects need to be aware of the dynamic nature of gender norms related to roles, responsibilities, and assets and investigate the potential impacts that interventions may have on the ownership, control, and use of assets [2, 8]. There is a paucity of literature describing the roles and responsibilities of men and women in pig-raising households on smallholder farms in east Africa as well as the entitlements each can claim over the benefits from the pig enterprise. This paper addresses that gap through a gender-disaggregated exploration of Ugandan smallholder pig farmers’ perceptions of asset ownership, control, and access, division of labour, and decision-making ability related to pig rearing and income. These perceptions are presented in the context of the potential impact of adopting improved diets for pigs (a pig productivity improvement). Contrasts between Ugandan statutory and customary law are described.

Small-scale pig production in east Africa can improve the welfare of smallholder farm families and lift people out of poverty [10–12]. East African smallholder pig farmers typically raise 1–2 pigs to pay for medicine, school fees, food, home improvements, seeds, funeral costs, and to buy other animals and expand their farms [11, 13, 14]. Pig keeping is attractive for several reasons: pigs require minimal inputs and labour, produce offspring in large numbers, and have short intervals between generations [15]. The inputs required to purchase cattle and to manage cattle (e.g. amount of land required for grazing or growing feed, amount of purchased feed [e.g. Napier grass], amount of water consumed daily) are typically higher than those for pigs. When the inputs required to raise cattle are beyond the resources of farmers, especially disadvantaged members of society, raising pigs may be within their reach [16, 17].

In Uganda in 2013, 38% of the population earned ≤$1.25 US dollars (USD) per day, and the gross national income per capita was low ($600 USD) [18]. Six million people (43% of the working population) were involved in subsistence production—58% of whom were female [19].

Almost 30% of the 7 million households in Uganda were headed by females of whom 20.5% were divorced or separated, 35.8% were widows, and 5.3% had never married) [19]. The average monthly income of female and male household heads was 125,000 and 179,000 Ugandan shillings, respectively ($37 and $52USD per month, or $1.22 and $1.71 per day, respectively, at time of publication) [19].

Traditionally women are not allowed to own cattle, but they are allowed to own pigs [20–23]. Given the high prevalence of poverty and the high number of people working in subsistence production, more than half of whom are women, it is not surprising that smallholder pig raising has become a popular enterprise in Uganda [18, 24]. In 2011, there were over 1.1 million smallholder farm families raising over 3.2 million pigs in Uganda [24].

This study, conducted in Masaka district in Central Region, Uganda, is part of a larger Smallholder Pig Value Chain Development (SPVCD) project lead by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) looking at rural and urban pig value chains in Masaka, Mukono, and Kamuli districts of Uganda. Masaka district is an area characterized by mixed cropping of bananas, coffee, vegetables, and maize, and some dairy farming [25]. Masaka district was identified by ILRI as an area with high pig population and high poverty levels [11, 25]. The SPVCD project in Uganda, supported by the European Commission, the International Fund for International Development, and Irish Aid, focused on improving the livelihoods, incomes, and assets of smallholder pig farmers, particularly women, in sustainable ways, through increased productivity, risk reduction, and market access improvement in pig value chains.

One component of SPVCD was to develop balanced diets (recipes) for pigs using locally available ingredients (e.g. banana leaves, avocado, maize bran, sun-dried fish). Locally available feed ingredients for pigs were identified by smallholder pig farmers and government extension workers through focus group discussions (FGDs) [11]. Participants reported they did not know how to combine the ingredients into nutritionally balanced diets for their pigs and that commercially prepared pig diets were beyond their financial means [11]. Participants also reported competition between humans and pigs for the same food and that food/feed shortages happened seasonally [11]. Pigs were malnourished and growing slowly [22]. Others report higher pig growth rates on east African smallholder farms, resulting in greater potential profit and revenue for farmers [26]. Hence, improved, nutritionally balanced diets for pigs on Ugandan smallholder farms were needed to improve pig growth rates and increase pig-enterprise revenue.

Locally available ingredients were sampled and analysed to determine their nutritional content [27]. Low-cost balanced diets, designed to enable pigs to grow more quickly than pigs were currently growing on east African smallholder farms, were developed using suitable local ingredients [28, 29]. A feed trial conducted in Uganda determined the rate at which pigs grew when fed the improved diets. Farmers attended training workshops to learn about the nutrient content of locally available feed ingredients suitable for pigs, pig growth rates, and how to make the improved diets.

Prior to broader dissemination of the improved diets, exploration of the potential impact of diet adoption on smallholder pig-farming household members was needed. The average growth rate of pigs on Ugandan smallholder farms will improve if pigs are fed the improved diets (Unpublished data Carter et al. 2016). Farmers earn more income per kilogram for heavier pigs than for light pigs (Unpublished data Levy et al. 2014). However, adoption of the improved diets may result in increased labour and resource requirements since home-grown ingredients must be collected, chopped, and mixed and some ingredients must be purchased. Labour and access to resources may not be evenly distributed among household members. The entitlements that household members may have over the benefits from increased pig productivity resulting from adoption of the improved diets may also vary and be influenced by societal norms, attitudes, and perceptions that shape ownership patterns and resource access. Others have documented east African gender norms associated with employment, and livestock and crop production, the ways in which gender norms vary between households, and signs that the gender norm status quo is not always maintained [1, 30–32]. The degree to which pig keeping benefits men, women, and families, as well as various family members’ investments in pig keeping, is largely unknown.

The purpose of this study was to explore smallholder pig farmers’ perceptions of the potential outcomes of adopting the improved diets on their farms; their potential to adopt the diets; constraints to adoption; ownership and access (land, pigs, cash); division of labour; allocation of pig-enterprise income; and the ways in which decisions about these topics are made at the household level. These topics were explored in the context of men and women’s roles, responsibilities, and agency, and sex of household head.

Gender norms and disparities between statutory and customary law that dictate household members’ ability to control, retain, and make decisions about investments and assets, and their within-household bargaining power, may result in differential benefit allocation between household members [1, 32, 33]. In this study, customary law refers to “customs that are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; practices and beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws” [34]. Statutory law refers to “A law or group of laws passed by a legislature or other official governing bodies” [35]. Customary law is recognized by the Ugandan courts, and its impact is greatest on people in rural areas [36, 37]. Seventy-seven per cent of the Ugandan population lives in rural areas; thus, customary law impacts much of the population [19].

The 1995 Ugandan Constitution guarantees property rights “without bias to gender or marital status” and “affirmative action in favour of marginalized groups based on gender or other reason created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing existing imbalances (ibid.)” [36]. Although the Constitution “mandates that state law prevails where it is in contradiction with customary law”, the mandates are rarely heeded [36]. A disconnect between Ugandan statutory and customary law has been well documented [36–39]. Legal pluralism wherein statutory laws coexist and interact with “state, customary, religious, project and local laws” is enshrined in the Constitution which results in individual’s ownership of assets being based on legal and social norms [36, 37].

The first 9 semi-structured FGD included a total of 67 people: 24 men and 41 women (of whom 17 were WFHH, and 24 were WMHH), and 2 boys enrolled in primary school who were sent by their mothers (1 WFHH and 1 WMHH) to represent them and participated in the man/boy group. Of the men participants, 23 (96%) were married and 1 (4%) was single. All were head of the household except for 1 unmarried 17-year-old man whose father was head of the household. Of the WFHH participants, 10 (59%) were widowed, and 7 (41%) were single. All were head of the household except for 1 unmarried woman whose mother was head of the household. Of the WMHH participants, all 24 (100%) were married and their husbands were all head of the household. The final 3 semi-structured FGD were mixed (4 men plus 4 WMHH; 4 men plus 4 WFHH; 4 men plus 2 WMHH and 2 WFHH). Participants in the mixed-gender FGD had attended one of the first 9 FGD and were selected and invited to attend the mixed-gender FGD by the VOs at the end of the first 9 FGD.

Our study indicates that WFHH and men gained, retained, and commanded control over the pig enterprise or pig-enterprise income. Some WMHH had overt decision-making ability when they were the owner of the pigs and their husbands did not choose to remove women’s command of the pig and pig-enterprise income, or in the absence of men, or when men failed to provide for them. However, some WMHH did not gain, retain, or command control over the pig enterprise or pig-enterprise income.

Some women reported having raised men’s pigs and then not receiving any financial compensation for their labour. Men reported that women were reluctant at times to clean pig pens because although women did a lot of the work associated with pig keeping, men were not transparent about pig-enterprise income. Other men argued that such behaviour only happened in the past and that nowadays men would not expect a woman to provide labour and not benefit from it. Women reported having to compensate men for raising pigs on men’s land because women did not own land of their own. Women lost motivation to raise pigs when men borrowed pig-enterprise income from them and never paid it back. “Sometimes when women sell pigs, their husbands borrow money from them but they never pay back. And this makes women lose interest to continue rearing pigs” one man explained. Women also lost motivation when they contributed labour to the pig enterprise and their husbands gave pig-enterprise income to another woman. “Does the other woman also do something to be able to take money to this home, or he just siphons out the money to the concubine in [name of village], whereas I [name] I am working hard…cutting trees…we have reared the pigs together. Is that fair?” one WFHH said. A final example from our study is of a man who exclaimed, “The women have got more points than men! You are winners! I like women. They are hard working. They stay at home, but if she does not like the project, it will not survive. She will make sure it fails. She will be saying ‘that pig is for the man’”.

Men, WMHH, and WFHH said that adoption of the new diets would improve pig growth, which would result in increased income from pig sales. However, allocation of pig-enterprise income and the degree to which household members benefitted from it varied within and between genders. Men and women both said that men and women allocate pig-enterprise income to benefit people within their households. Men and women both said that men spend pig-enterprise income to benefit people outside their households (second wife/family, extended family, lovers). Men and women both said that men spend pig-enterprise income to benefit only themselves. While men and women frequently said that men’s preference was to serve their own best interests, in particular to buy alcohol and sometimes clothes, some men said that awareness of “the role of a man” motivated men to provide for their children, their wife, needs of second wife and/or family, extended family, and lovers. Similar to our study, other authors report that at times men’s income allocation served men’s own needs and at other times served the needs of others [50]. The findings of our study support other authors’ claim that gender stereotyping about men’s spending preferences should be avoided [50].

One man said that women spend pig-enterprise income to benefit people outside their households (extended family), but no one else said this about women. No one said that women spend pig-enterprise income to benefit only themselves, but men and women both said that women spend pig-enterprise income to benefit both their household members and then themselves. Women were motivated by “the pain of poverty” and their preferences were to spend income to provide for their children, household, and extended family. Once other people had been provided for women would spend income on their own needs (clothes, hair). Perhaps women’s stated preference to spend more income on their children than on themselves can be explained as discussed by other authors, “women in traditional societies may lack a notion of personal welfare because their identities are too closely tied to the interests of the household” [51]. Moreover, this “overlap between personal and household interests preserves intra-household inequality” [51]. Similarly, other authors describe the strong link between Ugandan women’s identity and their domestic role [52].

A gender equality and development report claims that “increasing the share of household income controlled by women, either through their own earnings or cash transfers, changes spending in ways that benefit children” [53]. These findings, which are similar to our own, stand in contrast to other researchers who report that when playing experimental games, there was no evidence that women in eastern Uganda contributed more to the common pool than men [8].

Our findings are also similar to those whose discussions with smallholder farmers in Uganda indicated that men and women make agricultural production decisions based on the food security needs of their households, but at times income from agricultural sales may be spent on frivolous personal expenses rather than in ways that benefit the family as whole [31].

Our study demonstrates that Ugandan men and women allocated pig-enterprise income based on the interests of others (i.e. household members, second wife and/or family, extended family, lover), based on a mixture of their own and others’ interests, or based on their own self-interest. Thus, Ugandan smallholder pig-farming households cannot be viewed as one entity with a single set of preferences nor as multiple individuals operating solely in their own best interest, just as other authors have cautioned [4, 6–8].

The ability of household members to influence intra-household decision-making outcomes also differed. Participants described many instances when men and WFHH gained, retained, and exercised command over the pig enterprise and pig-enterprise income. Men made overt decisions about buying and selling pigs, and about how pig-enterprise income was used. Some men bought pigs because they “are the ones with money” indicating men’s access to financial resources was greater than that of women. Even if women provided all of the labour required to raise men’s pigs, some men sold the pigs and refused to let women express their opinion about how the income was spent. If men and women owned pigs together, some men took control over decision-making. Men sold women’s pigs unbeknownst to women and without women’s permission and when women were away (for instance at a burial). Men sold pigs owned by children (gifted to them by World Vision) and the wife had no input into the decision to sell or how the income was spent. Our findings are similar to others who report that although women owned livestock they did not have full control over the use and sale of the livestock or livestock products (e.g. milk and eggs) nor were they able to make decisions about the use of income from sales of livestock or livestock products [1].

Some men said that men no longer behave that way, or hoard money, because women know the law (their marital benefits rights). However, some women who owned pigs had to give their husband a piglet or money as compensation for the pig being raised in the man’s home. This was because even if the pig is a woman’s project, the project belongs to the man because it is done in his home. Other researchers report similar statements by Kenyan smallholder farmer FGD participants, for instance, who stated “Everything with blood in the household belongs to the man” [54]. Although “women claimed to have some influence in the selling”, it was men who owned the animals [54]. Therefore, men had the authority to sell animals and dominated decision-making about selling them despite women dominating decision-making about daily care of animals [54].

In our study, in some households, men and women each owned pigs and each made decisions about their own pig. Also some men had to consult with their wives about the price at which to sell pigs before a sale could be made.

At times men made decisions about how pig-enterprise income was allocated that women described as unfair and inequitable for women and children. Sometimes men indirectly controlled women’s pig-enterprise income by refusing to pay for household needs requiring women to use their income instead.

Men also had overt control over their wives’ behaviour. For instance, men did not allow women to sell their [women’s] pigs. Men also ordered women to sell their [women’s] pigs to solve a financial problem at home even though women were raising pigs with another objective in mind. Other authors report that in Ugandan societies “women tend to abide by male authority to avoid community gossip and to keep their marriages ‘stable’” although some women are beginning to defy these cultural norms [32].

One WFHH suggested men used physical violence, or the threat of it, to retain overt decision-making ability. Moreover, she said women are submissive and because of potential physical harm a woman would yield and would not challenge a husband’s decision (about how to spend pig-enterprise income). Although only one woman mentioned domestic violence, her statement is notable, particularly since domestic violence is a sensitive topic about which participants may not have wished to speak. Other authors argue that “because women’s status is intertwined with their husband’s, there are strong social pressures for women not to reveal personal feelings about their marital relationships that might undermine their commitment to the established social order” [55]. This may explain why only one participant mentioned domestic violence.

In Uganda, many (56.1%) 15–49-year-old women reported having experienced physical violence since the age of 15 [56]. Most commonly the perpetrator was their current (60%) or former (18.9%) husband or partner [56]. Similarly, most (55.7%) 15–54-year-old men reported having experienced physical violence since age 15; however, far fewer men reported that their current (31.1%), or former (5.4%) wife or partner, was the perpetrator [56]. In Central Region, the location of this study, 28.9% of women and 20.6% of men reported that a husband was justified in beating or hitting his wife if she argued with him [56]. Also, if a wife goes out without telling her husband (for instance to sell a pig), 51.3% of women reported a husband was justified in beating or hitting his wife and 31.5% of men reported it was justified [56]. When the report was released, The Daily Monitor, a leading national Ugandan newspaper reported that Mr. Bedha Balikudembe, the communications coordinator of Isis Wicce, a women’s rights organisation, said that women accepted wife beating as a “sign of love from their husbands” [57].

These customary cultural attitudes are telling and indicate that customary law is in sharp contrast to statutory law, namely The Domestic Violence Act of 2010. As other authors describe, the act states that “A person in a domestic relationship shall not engage in domestic violence” [33]. Moreover, “The consent of the victim shall not be a defence to a charge of domestic violence under this Act” [33]. Other authors provide an in-depth discussion of the history and challenges associated with implementing this act, but for reasons of brevity we will not discuss it here [33]. Suffice to say that customary law associated with domestic violence and the statutory law that criminalizes domestic violence are sharply juxtaposed within Central Region, Uganda. The threat of personal violence, and some men and women’s attitude that domestic violence is justified, undoubtedly play a role in women’s (in)ability to make decisions about pig buying and selling and the allocation of pig-enterprise income.

Men also had overt decision-making ability over pig buying and selling, and pig-enterprise income allocation even when they did not own the pig and even when the pig’s owner, a woman, had a different objective in mind when raising the pig. Other researchers report that livestock ownership at the household level is gendered, and women are more likely to own less valuable, smaller livestock (for example pigs) than men [58]. However, in their study of smallholder pig-keeping families in Gulu and Soroti districts in Uganda, other researchers reported pigs were owned by husbands in 66% of households and by wives/women in 23% of households [21]. Thus, fewer women than men owned pigs. Regardless, our study demonstrates that ownership of pigs and labour investments by Ugandan smallholder farm women did not guarantee decision-making ability, nor did it guarantee they would command or benefit from pig-enterprise income. Similarly, other researchers report that joint ownership did “not necessarily translate to joint decision making on assets” and that “within-couple inequality of rights can persist in joint ownership” [59]. Other studies also report that very few co-owners needed their co-owner’s involvement to sell or bequeath land which may explain the sale of pigs, a much less valuable commodity, without the co-owner’s consent [59]. The findings of our study support arguments put forward by other researchers, that future research and development projects in Uganda need to be aware of the complex nature of the gender norms related to ownership and asset control, and to investigate the potential impacts that interventions may have on the ownership, control, and use of assets [2].

Similar to men, WFHH made overt decisions about buying and selling pigs, and about how pig-enterprise income was used. Women in female-headed households gained, retained, and commanded control over pigs and pig-enterprise income allocation. Since they were head of the household, just like men, WFHH had overt decision-making ability.

In contrast, as mentioned earlier some WMHH did not gain, retain, or command control over the pig enterprise or pig-enterprise income rather their husbands exercised overt control. However, some WMHH gained, retained, and commanded control over pigs and pig-enterprise income allocation but reported “it depends”. According to WMHH, in some households, families discussed buying a pig and then men did the buying and in other households women took the initiative and bought a pig. However, according to WFHH, it was usually the women in male-headed households, and not the men, who bought pigs because women wanted to alleviate household poverty so decided to rear pigs.

Although men said they did not allow women to sell pigs, WMHH said that if their husband was not available then women could “look for the market”. Moreover, WMHH said that if they owned the pig then they did not have to consult with men about how to spend the money, but if the pig was owned jointly then they must consult. These findings are similar to others who report the ability of smallholder farming widows in western Kenya to do “everything [related to the pig enterprise] all by herself” [30]. Moreover, other researchers report that in western Kenya, 46% females and 54% males negotiated the selling price with butchers indicating men and women are both involved in pig sales in east Africa [60].

In our study, some husbands did not ask their wives for money from the pig-enterprise. They only asked how the money was going to be spent, and were happy that their burden to provide was lessened, which creates an additional burden on women to provide. Thus, some wives had command over income allocation and their husbands did not try to remove or reduce their wives’ command. Others researchers report similar findings that “a woman’s relationship with her partner shapes her asset rights” [59].

Additionally, WMHH said that sometimes they could decide how to spend the income from pigs because their husbands were no longer looking after them. A study of gender and tourism work in Uganda reports similar findings that men’s support of women is waning and rather than help their wives, men have “resorted to unproductive alcohol drinking” [32]. In that study, one participant described herself as “both a man and a woman” in her household because she receives so little help from her husband [32].

As we have discussed, men exercised overt decision-making ability over pig buying and selling and over the allocation of pig-enterprise income and often spent the income outside their household or in their own best interest. Conversely, few WMHH exercised overt decision-making ability over pig buying and selling and over the allocation of pig-enterprise income and often spent the income on their children and only spent any surplus on themselves. Thus, women were relatively disadvantaged with regard to decision-making and benefitting from pig-enterprise income compared to men. Some WMHH employed covert strategies that mitigated their relative disadvantage as did some men to maintain men’s relative advantage over women.

The inability of some women to gain, or retain or command pigs and pig-enterprise income meant they were not compensated for the labour they invested in pig rearing which affected their motivation to continue to raise pigs. As discussed previously, some men required compensation from women for raising pigs on their land (shirt, piglet, money). This results in a loss of income or potential profit for women which would be avoided if women owned land on which to raise pigs. In Uganda, few women who are not household heads own land by themselves (9%) or jointly [59]. This contributes to their inability to retain command over pigs and pig-enterprise income because they must raise pigs on land that is owned by someone else. More Ugandan women who are household heads own land by themselves (38%) or jointly (41%), but it is mainly Ugandan men who own land by themselves (43%) or jointly (53%) [59]. Similarly, other studies report that lack of control over land was an important concern for women in Bangladesh because women must give up 50% of their agricultural products to landowners [62].

Women’s motivation to raise pigs was decreased when men borrowed pig-enterprise income from women and did not pay it back. Women also lost motivation when they worked hard and reared pigs with their husbands and then men gave the pig-enterprise income to their [men’s] lover. Given the increased labour demands which some women would experience if they adopted the improved diets, despite the potential for faster pig growth and resulting increased income, if women anticipate they are unlikely to be compensated for the additional labour, and if they do not have decision-making ability over the use of pig-enterprise income, they may not be motivated to adopt the diets. Other studies also suggest that women and girls may be disinclined to adopt an agricultural productivity improvement if they are not compensated sufficiently to offset the additional labour they must invest [1].